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The global spread of  COVID-19 
has exposed the world’s largest and 
densest urban centres to bearing 
the brunt of  this pandemic. The 
invisible virus has forced thriving 
metropolises to empty their streets 
and shops to dead spaces absent of  
people and activity. It even triggers 
the doomsday question of, “Does 
COVID-19 mean the end of  cities?” 
In this article, we compare how two 
O ver the first few months of  2020, the novel coronavirus, which erupted in the Chinese 
city of  Wuhan around 1 January, 
engulfed around 200 countries and 
regions, infected over 12 million people 
and killed over 550,000 as of  8 July. 
This rapid spread from one locality to 
the entire world has quickly mobilised 
our responses to fighting COVID-19. 
Little collective response, however, has 
taken place, leaving most nations to 
muster their own resources to stem the 
virus within their closed borders. This 
has facilitated comparing nation-based 
data on new cases, death counts and 
relative performances in containing the 
virus. However, it has overshadowed a 
local focus on responses to COVID-19, 
especially by the most affected cities.
WEATHERING COVID-19: 
Lessons from Wuhan and 
Milan for Urban Governance 
and Sustainability
Global Crisis
great cities of  the East and West – 
Wuhan and Milan – have responded 
to the deadly virus, with their 
internal and external strengths and 
constraints. We also take the reader 
deep into the two cities’ neighbour-
hoods for a realistic sense of  how 
their local residents have dealt with 
COVID-19. We end by drawing crit-
ical lessons for urban governance 
and sustainability.
BY XIANGMING CHEN AND YI TERESA WU
The invisible virus has forced 
thriving metropolises to 
empty their streets and shops 
to dead spaces absent of 
people and activity.
Featured photo above: The empty plaza in front of Duomo di Milano, Italy
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While global in scope, COVID-19 has hit 
cities very differently. As the first epicentre of  the 
pandemic, Wuhan lost 3,869 residents, about 80% 
of  China’s total COVID-19 deaths. New York 
City, the epicentre of  the pandemic in the United 
States, has accounted for almost one-quarter of  
all deaths in the country. Since the coronavirus 
spreads faster in closer social and spatial interac-
tions, is density to blame for the high death counts 
in Wuhan and New York, whose urban cores 
have around 7,000 and 11,000 people per km2, 
respectively? Not so fast. Despite a density of  
over 20,000 people per km2 in central Shanghai, 
the city of  25 million people had only 339 
COVID cases and seven deaths. Other factors 
must be considered and can reveal a lot about 
cities’ capacities to respond to an unprecedented 
public health crisis and to enhance post-crisis 
governance and sustainability. 
To probe into these factors, we conduct a 
comparative analysis of  two COVID-19 epicen-
tres – Wuhan and Milan. The first section looks 
at the trends in COVID-19 infections and deaths 
in the two cities in global and regional contexts. 
The second section examines municipal and 
community responses to COVID-19 in terms 
of  containment strategy, medical infrastructure 
and external support versus constraint. The 
last section draws important lessons for urban 
governance and sustainability.
1. Seeing Through the Data
COVID-19 has generated a deluge of  data on 
infection and death in real time. We contextu-
alise city-level data on Wuhan and Milan through 
a statistical look at China and Italy in the global 
picture of  COVID-19 and the domestic regional 
contexts of  the two cities. 
A Global Glance
China and Italy have been among the world’s 
most COVID-affected countries. But they have 
very different trajectories in the virus’s spread, 
containment and destruction compared with 
other most-affected countries. China led the 
world in active cases and deaths from early 
January until late March. During that period, 
China and Iran were the only two developing 
and non-Western countries among the top 10 
countries ranked by total coronavirus cases. 
After Wuhan’s lockdown on 23 January, China 
peaked at 4,670 cases on 12 February, and 
around 80,000 cases on 1 March.1 These dates 
marked a sharp decline in new cases and slight 
increases in cases mostly due to imported cases.
Italy had few cases when China’s new cases 
peaked on 12 February. Despite a region-
al-to-national quarantine on 8 March, Italy’s 
4,825 deaths surpassed China’s total number of  
deaths (4,632 on 17 April)2 on 21 March. Italy’s 
cases reached 86,500 on 27 March and surpassed 
China’s highest number of  around 83,000 on 1 
May. In comparison, the United States topped 
100,000 cases on 27 March and surpassed Italy 
in the number of  deaths at 5,151 on 31 March. 
The US, Italy and several developed European 
countries remained among the world’s top 10 
most-affected nations through April. Turkey 
and Russia joined the list at the end of  April, 
as did Brazil in early May. At this point, China 
was no longer in the initial top 10 countries. As 
of  early July, increased infections in more devel-
oping countries like Pakistan, Peru and South 
Africa had pushed Italy out of  the top 10 and 
China out of  the top 20.
A Regional Perspective
To further frame the Wuhan-Milan comparison, 
we highlight the regional settings in which the two 
China and Italy 
have been among 
the world’s most 
COVID-affected 
countries. But they 
have very different 
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the Huanghelou tourist
site at night.
Source: Photo from 
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cities have been affected disproportionately. Hubei 
province, with Wuhan as its capital, is the regional 
epicentre of  COVID-19 in China. When the infected 
cases in Hubei peaked at nearly 5,000 on 25 February 
(see Figure 1A), they accounted for 83.3% of  all of  
China’s cases. This percentage remained more or less 
the same until 6 May, after China brought the virus 
under control. While Wuhan consistently accounted 
for the majority of  cases in the province, at 73.9% 
on 6 May, it was not an isolated epicentre. As of  
6 May, four out of  17 cities in Hubei had accumu-
lated 9,399 cases, which accounted for 13.8% of  
all cases in Hubei.3 The four cities border Wuhan 
on all sides. Not only did Wuhan have Hubei prov-
ince as the outer layer of  its COVID cases, it also 
spread the virus around its surrounding areas.
Lombardy, Italy’s wealthiest region in the north, 
was the regional epicentre of  the pandemic for Italy 
earlier during the outbreak. We see this through 
a combined analysis of  the national data from 
Worldometer and the subnational data reported 
by the Italian Ministry of  Health (see Figure 1B). 
Given the absence of  official data for February, we 
have picked three points in time to trace the trajec-
tory of  COVID-19 in Lombardy from early March. 
When Italy had only 2,502 cases on 3 March, 1,520 
(60.8%) were concentrated in the Lombardy region. 
This share dropped to 39.7% on 3 April, and to 
36.8% on 3 May. Lombardy was hardest hit earlier 
on, before the virus spread to other parts of  Italy. 
Lombardy differs drastically from China, where 
Hubei and Wuhan remained the regional and local 
epicentres throughout the pandemic. Lombardy’s 
epicentre over time, Milan’s share of  Lombardy’s 
cases rose from 7.4% on 3 March to 21.9% on 3 
April, and to 25.9% on 3 May. Similar to the virus 
connection between Wuhan and its surrounding 
cities, the city of  Bergamo, 50 km from Milan city on 
the edge of  Greater Milan, was an integral part of  the 
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regional epicentre. Some 40,000 people travelled from 
Bergamo and Spain to a Champions’ League foot-
ball game in Milan on 19 February 2020, of  whom 
many partied overnight, accelerating the spread of  
COVID-19 in the region.4 The Milan Fashion Week 
of  18-24 February also drew its usual large attend-
ance. These large social gatherings, coupled with 
geographical proximity of  Milan and smaller nearby 
cities, contributed to the virus’s spread in Lombardy.
A Local Comparative Focus
Hubei and Lombardy help us focus on Wuhan and 
Milan as urban epicentres where COVID-19 has 
inflicted the worst destruction and has been tackled 
most forcefully with local and non-local policy 
tools and medical resources. Figure 2 compares 
COVID-19 trends for both cities, even though the 
Lombardy, Italy’s wealthiest 
region in the north, was 
the regional epicentre of 
the pandemic for Italy 
earlier during the outbreak.
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data on Milan are limited to just one indicator. 
Wuhan experienced a spike in new cases early, 
pushing up both active and total cases, which then 
diverged sharply. Wuhan’s active cases dropped 
dramatically as the pandemic was brought under 
control, while total cases flattened out. Although 
coronavirus hit Milan later, its total cases grew 
continuously. Lurking behind these trends is 
the critical measure of  case fatality for both 
cities. Wuhan’s case fatality rate peaked at 6.6%, 
the highest in China, on 16 April when China 
adjusted the data on Wuhan upward, although 
it was still seen as lower than expected outside 
China. Given the absence of  death counts for 
Milan, we estimate the city’s case fatality rate 
to be around 15% around 16 April based on 
its total cases relative to Lombardy’s and the 
midpoint between the death rates for Lombardy 
vs Italy. This large differential between the two 
cities’ case fatality rates anticipates a focal anal-
ysis and explanation later.  
More people outside China are likely to 
have heard of  Milan than of  Wuhan, certainly 
before COVID-19. Wuhan, however, has carried 
the moniker of  “the Chicago of  China” since 
around 1900, when an American journalist 
visiting the city labelled it as such for its loca-
tion by major lakes, heavy industries and hub 
status for rail transportation.5 Wuhan has also 
preserved a small Concessions area by the 
Yangtze River that was built by European colo-
nialists and adventurers who had sailed up the 
river from Shanghai in the early 20th century. 
While Milan serves as Italy’s top financial centre 
and one of  Europe’s top fashion centres today, it 
has been a major industrial centre since around 
1800, albeit on a smaller scale today.
Other indicators in Table 1 show the two 
cities’ similarities and comparisons of  their 
varied responses to COVID-19. Wuhan’s urban 
core and Milan’s (contiguous) urban area were 
comparable in population, and so were Wuhan 
and Greater Milan, counting Wuhan’s popula-
tion according to household registration. One 
of  densest cities in Italy and Europe, Milan’s 
density was similar to Wuhan’s urban core. While 
Wuhan and Milan have different economic 
sectors, they are among China’s and Italy’s top 
economic centres. The two cities share a mixture 
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2018 data on 
Wuhan;
2017 data on 
doctors & nurses 
(Italy as a whole)
7. Administrative  
    composition
13 districts (7 urban core,
6 outer districts)






Capital city of 
Lombardy Region
Source: Computed and compiled from Wuhan city and health statistical yearbooks, OECD,
Wikipedia, and other online sources.
Table 1: Comparative Indicators on Wuhan and Milan (Lombardy)
Indicators
1. Population:
    1.1 Urban core
          (seven districts)
    1.2 Outer districts









2017 data for 




data for Milan  
2. Density (average)
    2.1 Urban core





7,315 per km2 (City)
2,029 per km2
(Metropolitan city)
2,783 per km2 (Urban area)
420 per km2 (Lombardy)









-  GDP ranked 9ᵗʰ among
    the top 10 Chinese cities;
-  A major manufacturing   
   center (auto, steel, IT)
China’s largest hub for rail, 
air, land and water 
transportation
(busiest national rail hub
with three stations)
One of Italy’s most
important rail hubs,
with five stations
-  Second largest GDP
    among EU cities;
-  10% of Italy’s GDP;
-  20% of Italy’s GDP;
- Italy’s top economic,    
  financial, fashion and 
  media center
4. Medical infrastructure
    4.1 Hospitals/100,000 
           people
    4.2 Hospital 
           beds/1,000 people
    4.3 Doctors/1,000 
    4.4 Nurses/1,000 
5. Location Central China Northern Italy
6. Ecology River/lake city River/lake city
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of  different and similar indicators on medical infra-
structure. Wuhan and Milan have a similar location 
relative to major rivers, political status as capitals of  
their respective regions, and as national transport 
hubs, especially for rail. While some similarities may 
lead us to expect similar local responses to COVID-
19, they alert us to different factors that matter to the 
two cities’ different responses to the coronavirus.
2. Factors That Really Matter
Diverse conditions at the municipal level and 
beyond mediate COVID-19’s local impacts and 
responses. The relationship between the pandemic 
and local responses reveals a lot about cities’ capac-
ities to manage a major crisis.
Governmental Response as a Difference-maker
The origin of  COVID-19, Wuhan quickly became 
China’s and the world’s epicentre before the virus 
spread far and wide and turned Milan and New 
York into their countries’ epicentres. In early 
January, there was confusion in Wuhan about the 
nature, spread and impact of  the coronavirus. It not 
only led to an initial delay in governmental response 
but also to a lack of  transparency and informa-
tion-sharing as perceived by the outside world. As 
the virus began to spread locally and regionally, 
the Chinese government locked down Wuhan on 
23 January when the city of  11 million people had 
around 500 confirmed cases, which accounted for 
half  of  the world’s cases at the time. The lockdown 
was very soon extended to 15 other cities in Hubei, 
affecting 35 million people. By 14 February, four 
other provinces and 48 cities had issued lockdown 
policies that affected around 500 million people.6 
Under lockdown, people were not allowed to 
leave Wuhan and a few worst-affected Hubei cities, 
where all public transport systems were shut down, 
while Shanghai and Beijing only restricted move-
ment among communities and neighbourhoods. 
Since the lockdown began right before the Chinese 
New Year, the year’s busiest travel period, about five 
million residents, including many migrant workers, 
had left Wuhan for the holiday prior to the lockdown. 
Wuhan also had around three million short-term 
residents, mostly migrant workers, not included in 
Table 1. This means the lockdown kept around nine 
million people in place. As China’s busiest rail hub, 
Wuhan’s three rail stations normally see around 150 
million trips through annually, with the heaviest 
traffic before the Chinese New Year holidays. The 
lockdown sealed off  the largest channel of  trans-
mission through mass mobility between Wuhan and 
the outside world. Halting any movement out of  
Wuhan ironically went a long way in preventing the 
virus from ravaging other parts of  China.
Unlike Wuhan, Milan had a gradual and phased 
response. After the confirmation of  14 cases in 
Lombardy on 21 February (Figure 1B), Milan and 
10 other cities in northern Italy were put under 
quarantine requiring social distancing and sheltering 
at home. On 25 February, the quarantine expanded 
to school closures and teleworking for Lombardy 
and other northern regions, creating a vast “Red 
Zone”. These quarantine measures were extended 
to all Italian regions the next day. On 8 March, Italy’s 
Minister of  Health issued a new decree extending 
most restrictive measures to the Lombardy region 
While Wuhan and Milan have 
different economic sectors, they 
are among China’s and Italy’s top 
economic centres. The two cities 
share a mixture of different and similar 
indicators on medical infrastructure.
Piazza della 
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and other provinces in central-northern Italy, which 
put 16 million people under quarantine. Taking 
advantage of  lax enforcement, a growing number 
of  people left the north for southern Italy to flee the 
virus, spreading transmission to other largely unaf-
fected regions. In response, the government adopted 
a new “staying at home” decree on 11 March to 
implement true quarantine. It was followed by a ban 
on all non-essential activities on 21 March. People 
who went out without a legitimate reason would 
be fined up to €4,000. Despite these incremental 
efforts to contain the virus, they left enough open-
ings and loopholes for continued transmission 
within and beyond Milan and Lombardy until 
COVID-19 reached all corners of  Italy, which 
became the world’s No. 2 in cases behind the US 
by early May.
The total lockdown of  Wuhan (and Hubei) 
stopped the spread quickly, while the phased quar-
antine in Milan (and Lombardy) was less effective 
in containing the virus for some time. The lock-
down of  Wuhan came so suddenly on 23 January 
that some local residents did not know about it until 
their relatives outside China informed them via the 
Chinese messaging app WeChat.7 The lockdown 
shut down Wuhan’s highways, railways and intra-city 
public transport systems. It imposed curfews on 
communities and allowed people to enter and exit 
only at particular times. And all government-owned 
national, provincial and local TV stations conveyed 
a consistently strong message about the lockdown’s 
necessity and benefits. In Milan, residents were 
initially misled by the public information that they 
could continue their normal life after the initial 
set of  cases and that masks were useless and they 
should just wash their hands. “It took Italian people 
a long time to realise the seriousness of  this emer-
gency because of  the slow government response 
and incorrect media promotion.”8 The differentially 
effective responses reflect the differences in govern-
ance capacity that play into other key factors.
Making the Medical Infrastructure Work
To contain and suppress COVID-19 in a pandemic 
epicentre, local medical infrastructure must work 
effectively under extraordinary pressure. An integral 
part of  the municipal service apparatus, healthcare 
facilities depend in quantity and quality on sustained 
investment and enhancement by local governments, 
with supplementary support from higher-level 
authorities. Lombardy has the best healthcare 
system in Italy. It was even regarded as the second 
most-efficient in the world, illustrated by a promo-
tional brochure featuring the line, “Be healthy, 
come to Lombardy.”9 While we expected Milan’s 
medical infrastructure to be superior to Wuhan’s 
due to Italy’s generally more advanced economy, 
Table 1 shows comparable indicators which, except 
for hospital availability, favour Wuhan. Yet the two 
cities’ medical responses to the coronavirus have 
gone far beyond a few indicators on local medical 
infrastructure.
Wuhan had 4,639 healthcare facilities in 2018, only 
398 of  which were hospitals, which translated into 
3.59 hospitals per 100,000 people (Table 1). The surge 
of  cases from late January to mid-February over-
whelmed the local hospitals, most of  which were not 
equipped to handle COVID patients. The accelerated 
transmission occurred as a result of  large numbers 
of  people who rushed to hospitals but were told to 
quarantine at home, which in turn spread the virus 
within families and around neighbourhoods. The 
4,241 community medical centres, neighbourhood 
clinics and other small facilities were of  little use to 
combat this vicious virus. The national government 
stepped up into this fight. By 6 February, the national 
government built two new hospitals in Wuhan in less 
than 10 days to relieve the strained local hospitals. 
The total lockdown of Wuhan (and Hubei) 
stopped the spread quickly, while the phased 
quarantine in Milan (and Lombardy) was less 
effective in containing the virus for some time. 
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Moreover, the municipal government 
built 16 Fangcang shelter hospitals. 
Rapidly converted from existing public 
venues such as exhibition centres and 
stadiums, these large, makeshift health-
care centres isolated COVID patients 
with mild to moderate symptoms from 
their families and communities and 
provided them with basic medical care, 
food, activities and shelter.10 These 
hospitals treated 12,000 patients, one out 
of  every four patients in Wuhan. They 
lightened the burden on designated 
hospitals for acute patients where ICU 
beds had already been occupied. 
In the early days of  the pandemic, 
the national government sent over 
42,000 generally younger medical 
workers from across the country, 
including military medical personnel, 
to Wuhan and other affected cities in 
Hubei province.11 This mobilisation of  
national medical resources was critical 
in containing the virus locally by halting 
the spiral of  deaths, taking the infected 
from homes and helping them recover. 
This was reflected in the rapid drop in 
new cases and the noticeable decline in 
active cases around 18 February (see 
Figure 2). On 1 March, all the patients at 
one Fangcang hospital were discharged. 
By then, 7,255 of  the 13,467 beds at 16 
Fangcang hospitals had become avail-
able. Of  the 26,911 beds at designated 
COVID hospitals, 6,704 were unoc-
cupied.12 On 10 March, all Fangcang 
hospitals were retired, including the 
one converted from the city’s largest 
convention centre. By mid-March, 
3,000 members of  21 medical teams 
left Wuhan for their home cities and 
provinces.13 Wuhan’s own medical 
infrastructure would not have been 
able to withstand the marauding virus 
without an unprecedented infusion of  
extra-local medical assistance. It literally 
broke the curve of  the outbreak.
Unprepared to deal with a surge in 
COVID-19 patients early on, hospitals 
in Milan and Lombardy quickly became 
overburdened by early March. This 
was not unexpected, given the lesser 
hospital capacity adjusted for the 
populations of  Milan and Lombardy 
(see Table 1). Unlike Wuhan, Milan 
could not expect or count on massive 
assistance from the national govern-
ment, due to Lombardy’s considerable 
regional autonomy and most-wealthy 
status among all Italian regions. In 
the period up to 10 March, a growing 
number of  infected people arrived 
at hospitals in Milan and the broader 
region, with some barely able to breathe 
upon arrival. Of  Lombardy’s 737 ICU 
beds available for COVID patients, 
more than 600 were filled. At a major 
hospital in Milan, half  of  the beds were 
dedicated to treating COVID patients. 
Rushing to add ICU beds, Lombardy’s 
health chief  talked about adding 500 
ICU beds at Milan’s expo centre.14 In 
Lombardy, 20-30% of  the medical 
personnel were infected and some of  
them took up ICU beds. By 25 March, 
40 Italian doctors had died from the 
virus, most of  them in Lombardy.15 
The Italian government tried to rush 
10,000 medical school students into 
service before graduation. Insufficient 
hospital beds and doctors forced some 
sick patients to return home, which 
contributed to a very high case fatality 
rate of  8.5%, twice as high as elsewhere 
in Italy.16 This was even higher than 
Wuhan’s highest rate of  7.7%, reached 
on 16 April when the Chinese govern-
ment adjusted the death count upward 
by 50%. By then, Italy’s case fatality 
rate was in the double digits and led all 
countries at 14% up to mid-May. With 
the world’s second-oldest population, 
after only Japan, Italy suffered a dispro-
portionately high fatality rate among its 
elderly, with 41% and 35% of  all deaths 
in the 80-89 and 70-79 age groups.17   
Given the comparable indicators 
on available hospital beds and doctors 
relative to the populations of  Wuhan 
vs Milan (Table 1), why did the former 
fare better in hospitalising and caring 
for COVID patients? It is tempting 
to attribute this mainly to the rapid 
construction of  dedicated new hospi-
tals, the creation of  Fangcang hospitals 
and deployment of  outside doctors and 
nurses in Wuhan. A more important 
difference resides inside Italy’s national 
and regional healthcare systems in dealing 
with a severe pandemic. Under Italy’s 
decentralised regional healthcare since 
the 1990s, private hospitals have done 
better than public hospitals by taking 
To contain and 
suppress COVID-19 in 






Source: Photo by Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP, News Channel 8, Tampa, Florida, February 18, 2020; accessed from https://
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Center in Wuhan in central China’s Hubei Province
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both insured and paying patients. The public hospi-
tals lost around 25,000 beds during 1995-2018. The 
competition has forced public hospitals to upgrade 
themselves at the expense of  community care facili-
ties and services. During the pandemic, Lombardy’s 
underfunded community healthcare services could do 
little for rapidly growing infections as COVID patients 
rushed to public hospitals and overwhelmed them.18 
Community health centres and clinics in Wuhan, 
which accounted for the majority of  its medical facili-
ties, also helped little in containing the virus. 
Communal and Individual Responses
The success of  lockdowns and quarantines in 
halting or reducing mobility and creating and 
sustaining social distancing depends on reactions 
from communities and residents. Community 
support for individual physical and mental health 
and individual adaptation during lockdowns and 
quarantines are critical to how effective medical 
infrastructure can be in isolating patients from 
homes, containing viral transmission and miti-
gating death rates through care and treatment. 
Top-down containment won’t work well without 
bottom-up cooperation. Wuhan in comparison to 
Milan and Lombardy illustrates the importance of  
communities’ and residents’ responses relative to 
top-down containment measures in local contexts.
For Wuhan, the total lockdown and its rigid 
enforcement caught many communities and resi-
dents off  guard and initially in shock. Communities 
were figuring out how to operationalise govern-
ment restrictions on movement. Some residents 
were concerned about whether the virus could be 
contained and how to obtain food and medicine. 
With the lockdown imposed right before the Chinese 
New Year, many families had already purchased 
and stored a certain amount of  basic food items, 
such as cooking oil, rice and meat. In cooperation 
with municipal and district governments, commu-
nity-level administrative units organised people 
living in high-rise towers of  residential compounds 
(xiao qu) into large WeChat groups of  up to 1,000 
residents. WeChat also allowed health authorities 
to use a green QR code on people’s cell phones to 
verify people’s health status regarding COVID-19 
and moving around locally, and later nationally after 
the lockdown was lifted on 8 April. The legacy of  
state-owned enterprises and agencies as work units 
(danwei) was reactivated to help organise these 
virtual groups. They became the primary mecha-
nism for sharing mass communication and medical 
information, recording the daily temperature, 
assisting the administration of  testing, and placing 
orders for deliverable groceries.19 While the munic-
ipal and district governments assigned officials to 
help neighbourhoods deliver groceries, commu-
nity volunteers, including younger retirees, played a 
stronger role in enforcing lockdown regulations and 
responding to residents’ daily needs.
In Milan and the Lombardy region, initial 
community and individual responses were coloured 
by the health authorities’ early underestimation 
of  COVID-19 as a normal flu. The quarantine of  
Lombardy and other northern regions on 8 March 
woke most people up to the COVID-19 threat. 
Many tried to take trains out of  Milan, despite travel 
restrictions. This exodus also reflected the fact that a 
good number of  people in Milan and Lombardy were 
off-site students or workers who wanted to return 
to their families, even though it could spread the 
virus to more people. The public response became 
more accepting as the regional quarantines were 
extended to other parts of  the country. A Milan resi-
dent’s expression of  being responsible for self  and 
others20 reflected a broader public acceptance of  the 
quarantine. According to a nationally representative 
survey of  3,452 Italian adults between 18 and 20 
March, nearly 100% of  the respondents endorsed 
four recommended public health measures: hand-
shake avoidance (95.2%), social gathering avoidance 
(94.7%), non-essential activities curfew (93.1%) and 
The success of lockdowns and quarantines in halting or reducing 
mobility and creating and sustaining social distancing depends on 
reactions from communities and residents. Top-down containment 
won’t work well without bottom-up cooperation. 
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non-essential-shop closure (89.0%).21 Regarding 
masks, the government issued a series of  guide-
lines from the end of  February to 4 May, when 
it became compulsory to wear masks nationally. 
While not intentional, this phased approach gave 
people incremental time to overcome the orig-
inal refusal and the lack of  a tradition of  wearing 
masks. Different from and yet similar to Wuhan 
and Hubei, people in northern Italy and nation-
ally adapted to the gradual and less restrictive 
quarantine as the government messaging sank 
in and the gloomy reality of  more deaths set in.
The Wuhan case demonstrates a quick and 
complete communal and individual acceptance of  
the lockdown. The top-down control was met and 
absorbed by cooperation from and between the 
subordinated community and collectively minded 
residents living in a denser and more-managed 
residential environment. This still left enough 
space for informal responses from some WeChat-
linked groups within and outside residential blocks 
to provide help. These groups, often run by volun-
teers, could helped isolated residents secure food, 
medicine and other supplies. They also provided 
emotional support, with members trading recipes 
and virtual workouts.22 Since the intra-city public 
transport system was shut down, a small number 
of  young volunteers with their own cars drove 
doctors and nurses to their hospitals and delivered 
emergency medicine to elderly residents. 
In Milan, the “Voluntary Emergency 
Brigades”, a grassroots initiative in partnership 
with the municipal government and the Italian 
NGO Emergency, organised young people to 
bring groceries and medicines to infected people 
in quarantine, especially the elderly and other 
vulnerable people. Many of  the project’s 300 
volunteers were students or young people who 
had lost their jobs and used their unfortunate idle 
time to help those in need.23 In Lombardy, priests, 
who are central to Italian communal life, stepped 
up as the spiritual pillar of  the affected commu-
nities and families. They risked, and sometimes 
gave, their lives in attending to the spiritual needs 
of  the often older and devout Italians hardest hit 
by the virus. Bergamo, a smaller city not far from 
Milan but hit harder, lost 24 priests in 20 days. 
During their risky visits to hospital wards or family 
homes, the priests delivered last rites through 
WhatsApp to the dying, at hospital bedsides 
and outside family bedrooms.24 In different and 
similar ways, the two cases confirm that the 
government responses through rigid lockdown 
or loose quarantine would have worked less well 
without adaptive and cooperative community and 
individual initiatives.
3. Lessons for Urban Governance and 
Sustainability
As two of  the hardest-hit cities, Wuhan and Milan 
have gone through a lot of  pain, with the loss of  
thousands of  their residents and the shattering of  
their local economies and urban life. The empty 
and eerie streets during Wuhan’s 76-day (23 
January-8 April) lockdown and Milan’s 72-day (8 
March-18 May) quarantine have etched into the 
memories of  their residents. While both cities 
have recently reopened, their slow return to a new 
normal begs the big question of  what COVID-19 
reveals about the governance and resilience of  
large and dense cities.
Cities do not and cannot combat and beat 
a global pandemic by themselves. Wuhan and 
Milan have proved it, and so has New York 
more recently as another pandemic epicentre. 
In dealing with the unprecedented crisis posed 
by COVID-19, different cities can expect and 
receive different assistances, given their national 
and global contexts. Wuhan can expect and has 
received massive medical and financial support 
from the national government. This outside 
help has also included horizontal assistance in 
medical teams from all provinces and major cities. 
As two of the 
hardest-hit cities, 
Wuhan and Milan 
have gone through 
a lot of pain, 
with the loss of 
thousands of their 
residents and the 
shattering of their 
local economies 
and urban life.
Masses resumed as Italy 
is easing its lockdown 
measures.
(AP Photo/Luca Bruno)
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The other hard-hit cities near Wuhan also obtained 
targeted infusion of  medical resources from Beijing 
and other provinces. This alleviated the financial 
burden of  Hubei province that otherwise would 
have had to relieve cities under its administration. 
The government also paid all testing and treatment 
expenses for Wuhan’s residents and patients. These 
massive and expensive government measures added 
up to what turned out to be a won “people’s war” 
against the coronavirus. The victory has been touted 
with a repeated reference to Wuhan as a “heroic city”. 
The uneven cross-city effort in China to contain 
SARS in 2003 offered a historical lesson for fighting 
COVID-19 with a coordinated national campaign.    
The wealthiest region of  Italy, with considerable 
economic autonomy, Milan and Lombardy have 
received little direct help from the national govern-
ment, despite being hardest hit. Although Italy was the 
first and hardest-hit country in the European Union, it 
received little early assistance from other EU members. 
Only later did Germany accept 47 COVID patients 
from Italy, while it also stopped 800,000 surgical 
masks shipped from China en route to Italy.25 
Whether extra-local help comes or not, crisis-
stricken cities need strong local leadership during 
and after a major crisis. Yet municipal leadership is 
accountable to both higher authorities and local resi-
dents differently in different systems. In the Chinese 
context, the central government replaced both the 
Party Secretaries of  Hubei province and Wuhan 
on 13 February for under-reporting and incompe-
tence in the early stage of  the pandemic. The new 
municipal and provincial leaders immediately intro-
duced a new governance system, deploying many 
officials to the neighbourhood level to monitor and 
enforce the lockdown. This was critical in bringing 
the pandemic under speedy control. On 10-11 
May, when six new COVID cases were discovered 
in a district of  Wuhan, the municipal leadership 
removed the district’s Party Secretary for negligence 
and slow response. This small relapse prompted the 
municipal government to instruct all district author-
ities to test all 11 million residents across Wuhan’s 
13 districts in 10 days, despite its daunting execution 
and cost. With 67% of  all the COVID cases concen-
trated in its dense urban core (see Table 1), Wuhan 
can use the recovery to accelerate its long-term plan 
for creating six sub-centres of  high-tech-led devel-
opment and its induced urban living in the city’s 
much less crowded outer districts.26  
Milan has had a strong mayor at the head of  the 
city council since 1993. In responding to COVID-
19, Mayor Giuseppe Sala has exercised a strong and 
steady hand. When Milanese continued to congregate 
around Navigli, a popular area for people to enjoy 
traditional afternoon drinks (aperitivo) and dinners, 
even after the quarantine, Mayor Sala publicly 
threatened to close the entire area. In planning for 
post-COVID recovery and redevelopment, Mayor 
Sala has decided to reallocate 35 km of  road space 
previously used by cars to bikes and pedestrians. A 
new 30-km-per-hour speed limit aims to make traffic 
more fluid and give pedestrians more space to spread 
out safely.27 These measures are part of  Milan’s 
post-pandemic effort to fast-track key elements 
of  the Milan 2035 Master Plan for implementation 
by 2025. Unlike in China, however, Milan’s mayor 
faces far more constraints from competitive polit-
ical parties and diverse civil groups in using bold and 
aggressive policy tools to counter an unprecedented 
crisis like COVID-19. The pandemic has also cast a 
spotlight on cross-border policy mobility in urban 
governance and responses to a major public health 
crisis. Similar to what Milan has done but with a 
more aggressive twist, the Mayor of  London, Sadiq 
Khan, and Transport for London have announced 
plans to turn parts of  central London into one of  
the largest car-free zones in any large and dense 
city in the world. We can also trace forward the 
Fangcang shelter hospital converted from Wuhan’s 
Convention Centre to the temporary use of  Milan’s 
Expo Centre and New York’s Javits Centre as make-
shift hospitals for COVID patients.  
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Medical workers from 
Jilin University cheer 
before boarding a 
flight out of Wuhan 
on April 8. Four days 
earlier President Xi 
Jinping and Premier 
Li Keqiang bow 
their heads to the 
coronavirus's victims. 
Source: Photos by EPA/Jiji and Xinhua/AP, Nikkei Montage, April 9, 2020; accessed from https://asia.
nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Wuhan-liberated-but-Xi-s-virus-victory-day-remains-elusive. 
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Finally, there is an opportunity in any crisis, as implied 
by the two Chinese characters (危机) making up the English 
word “crisis”. COVID-19 has woken up large and dense 
cities to improve their governance capacities, strengthen their 
pre-pandemic public health infrastructure and conduct a new 
round of  planning, or refine their exit plans in full recognition 
of  their national and global advantages and constraints exposed 
by COVID-19. If  this happens, the world’s greatest cities, like 
Wuhan and Milan, will not only survive this pandemic but also 
thrive in a more sustainable post-COVID urban world. 
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